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ABSTRACT
In recent years much has been said both about Russia's status as a democracy, as well as
the  issue  of  falsification  in  Russian  elections.  While  there  is  little  reason  to  challenge  the
assertion that Russia's transition from dictatorship to democracy has been far from satisfactory,
much more can be said about the nature of its elections. While the nature of Russian politics are
such that virtually no national election is fair, I argue that it is not clear that elections in Russia
do not represent, on the whole, the will of the Russian people.
This thesis draws primarily on two approaches: the use of opinion poll results and the
comparison of returns form national and local elections. Utilizing these two resources I argue
that it is rational to conclude that the majority of Russians support and vote for Putin, Medvedev,
and generally candidates of the party United Russia. Given this conclusion, I examine several
hypotheses  which  attempt  to  explain  why  Russians  support  their  leaders,  paying  particular
attention to the popularity of Putin and the cultural aspect of authoritarianism.
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CHAPTER 1
ITRODUCTIO AD BACKGROUD
       -  "It will not happen soon, if it ever happens at all, that 
Russia will become the second edition of, say, the U.S. or 
Britain in which liberal values have deep historic 
traditions." - Vladimir Putin
1.1 DEMOCRACY AND ELECTIONS IN RUSSIA
That Russia's status as a democracy is in dispute should come as no surprise .1 What
originally looked like a triumph for democracy following the fall of the Soviet Union has instead
led to a quasi-authoritarian state wherein the office of the president has not changed hands from
one party to another in the Russian Federation's seventeen years of existence. Moreover, political
victories for Vladimir Putin, his hand-picked successor Dmitri Medvedev, as well as his party of
power  United Russia  seem only to  have become more predictable since the former's  rise  to
power in 2000. Indeed, in the past two presidential elections both Putin (2004) and Medvedev
(2008) officially won more than 70% of the popular vote, far more than Putin's 53% in 2000. The
official support for United Russia, the overwhelmingly dominant party in parliament which has
unequivocally  supported  Putin  since  its  inception  (although  both  Putin  and  Medvedev  are
technically independents), has grown astronomically over the past few election cycles, as well.
Such impressive increases in support for Putin, Medvedev, and United Russia, both at the
national  level  and  the  local  level,  have  met  with  accusations  of  cries  of  unfairness  and
falsification.  Such  accusations,  which  typically  denounce  Kremlin-orchestrated  attempts  to
1 See Freedom House, "Map of Freedom in the World," http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?
page=363&year=2009 (accessed November 28, 2009); The Economist, "The Economist Intelligence Unit
Democracy Index," http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_TABLE_2007_v3.pdf; Luke March,
"Managing Opposition in a Hybrid Regime: Just Russia and Parastal Opposition."
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suppress opposition parties and tamper with election results are in fact nothing new to Russia.2
The electoral environment in Russia is certainly neither fair nor conducive to fostering healthy
democratization, and many Russians, as we shall see, understand that the country is not fairly
run. However, the implication that apparent support Putin, Medvedev and United Russia is an
illusion, artificially created by electoral fraud is not at all clear. In spite of undemocratic control
wielded by the current  government,  I  hope to show that  the majority of Russians do indeed
support  their elected officials, despite any isolated falsification.
  The focus of what follows is three-fold: I  intend to explore whether there are good
reasons to conclude that substantial voter fraud has regularly taken place in Russia to the degree
that certain candidates would not otherwise be easily elected. In fact, I hope to show that there is
good reason to conclude that, despite Putin's  machinations,  both he and representatives from
United Russia in the Duma (Russia's lower house of parliament) are fairly elected in what may
be called the minimalist sense that they simply receive the majority of votes. Secondly, given the
falsification that does take place, I examine what best explains the Russian populace's general
support   for  Putin  and his  party,  given the clear  authoritarian and anti-democratic  nature of
Putin's government. The final section explores what support for Putin-Medvedev government
might say about Russia's political culture.    
In what follows I begin by outlining the political situation currently in place in Russia,
explaining the history and platform of major political parties and voting trends over roughly the
past  ten  years.  I  address  accusations  of  falsification  by drawing on  and  comparing  election
returns from several local elections in 2009 and 2010 in order to first to detect any clear signs of
2 See Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov, and Andrei Ryabov, Between Dictatorship and Democracy, 42, 49, 51;The
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, "OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Report,"
http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2004/06/3033_ed.pdf.
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voter fraud for United Russia at the local level. These results are compared with the results of the
national Duma election of 2007 to judge how realistic official support for United Russia appears
to be at the national level. I then turn to the results of several different polling organizations to
lend credibility to the argument that the majority of Russians favor (and thus in all likelihood
vote for) United Russia. Chapter three elaborates upon the nature of the current government in
place, explaining how it has shaped society and how, regardless of any electoral legitimacy, it has
suppressed  civil  society,  strengthened  the  central  government,  and  fostered  a  system  that
marginalizes opposition parties, thus making it very unlikely for opposition candidates to win
offices of national importance.
The remainder of this paper addresses not why Russia has the government it has, but
rather, given the present government Russia does have, why Russians approve of it. Of particular
importance  here  is  the  examination  of  whether  Russia  has  a  significantly  different  political
culture from Western countries.  Particular  attention to whether  Russians are for or against  a
democratic form of government and whether concepts such as authoritarianism and nationalism
are essential to understanding Russian approval ratings.
1.2 THE POLITICAL ARENA IN RUSSIA
After roughly seventy years of single-party rule, Gorbachev's implementation of glasnost'
("openness"),  perestroika  ("rebuilding"),  and  novoe  myshlenie   ("new  thinking")  in  the  late
1980's introduced a relaxation to government interference and suppression in the lives of Soviet
citizens.  At  the  same  time  Gorbachev's  new  policies  gradually  allowed  for  the  creation  of
opposition political parties. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union their number rapidly
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multiplied. Since the early 1990's, however, only a handful have maintained any real relevance.
By the mid 1990's, for example, only a small fraction of regional parliamentary deputies and
governors  belonged  to  any party.3 Perhaps  more importantly,  survey data  showed that  party
affiliation was a poor predictor of policy implementation.4 
Table 1, found at the end of this chapter, attempts to illustrate the differences amongst
Russia's major political parties. It is impossible to sort these parties out perfectly along a single
left-right axis, given the inherent murkiness of Russian politics in general. Nonetheless, the table
provides an estimation of where the parties stand on very general issues.
Without a doubt, the most powerful and influential party remains United Russia, the latest
successor in a line of parties of power the stand for little more than support for the Kremlin.
Formed by the combination of Unity (the party of power which supported Yeltsin without fail)
and the party bloc Fatherland and All Russia, United Russia was assembled after the election of
Putin to president in 2000, and has since produced little more than steadfast support for Putin's
(and now Medvedev's) policies. United Russia has been depicted as being neither a true political
party nor a mass movement,5 as well as nothing more than a party "of bureaucrats and policy
makers"6 with a "bland and ideologically ambiguous platform" which relies heavily on its control
of mass media.7  Like other parties of power its strength comes from the use "of broader regime-
type  relationships...used  instrumentally  by  those  already  there  to  remain  in  power."8 In
advertising United Russia's platform, former party leader Boris Gryzlov has only offered such
3 Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, "Central Governing Incapacity and the Weakness of Political Parties," 136-137.
4 Ibid.
5 Richard Sakwa, "Elections and National Integration in Russia," 125.
6 Andrew Konitzer, Electing Russia's Governors, 223.
7 Nicklaus Laverty, "Limited Choices: Russian Opposition Parties and the 2007 Duma Elections," 365.
8 Luke March, "Managing Opposition in a Hybrid Regime," 505.
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banalities as the "ideology of success" and "common sense."9  Indeed, United Russia's political
ambiguity  leads  it  to  such  contradictory  stances  as  a  call  for  both  free  markets  and  state
regulation.10 Because of such contradictions, on top of the party's ambiguous stance on almost
every issue, I classify it as centrist.
The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (hereafter CPRF) arguably represents the
strongest opposition party to United Russia, though its popularity has waned dramatically over
the last  ten years.  Originally outlawed after  the fall  of  the Soviet  Union,  the revived CPRF
emphasizes Russian nationalism,11 while deemphasizing its Marxist-Leninist heritage by blaming
those who deviated from the proper socialist philosophy under the Soviet Union.12 Its platform
does claim, however, that Lenin's maxim concerning imperialism as the final stage of capitalism
has  been  confirmed.13 The  CPRF  has  pushed  for  "voluntary"  reinstatement  of  USSR,  but
advocates power through constitutional means.14 Like the Communist Part of the Soviet Union,
the CPRF is highly critical of capitalism, calling it a "path to social repression, which leads to
national  catastrophe  and  the  end  of  Russia's  civilization."15 However,  unlike  the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, its platform is acceptant of private property, as well as private control
of production, although it does advocate state regulation in the areas of  agriculture and finance.16
It is perhaps the most grassroots party still active in Russia, being the only one, for example, to
distribute information to potential voters in traditional forms of posters, hand-outs, etc.17  It is
9 Stephen White, "The Political Parties," 85.
10 Ibid.
11 Derek Hutcheson, Political Parties in the Russian Regions, 20.
12 J.T. Ishiyama and S. Shafqat, "Party Identity Change in Post-Communist Politics," 445-446.
13 Kommunisticheskaia Partiia Rossijskoj Federatsii, http://kprf.ru/party/program.
14 Laverty, 370.
15 http://kprf.ru/party/program
16 Ishiyama and Shadqat, 445-446.
17 Sakwa, 125.
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also the only opposition party with a national structure and a party press.18 Led by Gennady
Zyuganev,  the  CPRF has  traditionally performed the  strongest  in  the  south-west  (politically
known as  the  "red  belt")  amongst  typically  older,  less-educated,  and  below-average  income
groups.19
Also on the left  side of the political  spectrum is the rather new Fair Russia.  Formed
through the j alliance of previous parties Rodina, the Pensioner's Party, and the Party of Life, Fair
Russia  emphatically pushes  for  a  socialist  government.  Distancing itself  somewhat  from the
communistic government of the USSR, the official party program of Fair Russia decries the
"Soviet Socialism" as implying (among other things) a command economy, "the hypertrophy of
government [owned] property...a single party system, and terror before great leaders.20 However,
the party's platform praises the socialist system of the Soviet Union for its industrial production,
provision of infrastructure, and the building of "the best educational system in the world."21  Led
by Speaker of the Federation Council Sergei Mironov (Russia's upper chamber of parliament),
Fair Russia absorbed The United Socialist Party of Russia, as well as the Russian Ecological
Party. The CPRF, however, balked at an offer to join forces. Despite its declared intention to
provide a left alternative to the supposed center-right status of United Russia, some have charged
Fair Russia for being a puppet of the Kremlin meant to imitate the economically socialist stance
of the CPRF and thereby sap away the latter's support.22
Yabloko, whose name means "apple" in Russian through a partial acronym of the last
names of founding members Gregori Yavlinsky, Yuri Boldyrev, and Vladimir Lukin, arguably
18 White, 84.
19 Hutcheson, 23-24.
20 Spravedliia Rossiia, http://www.spravedlivo.ru/information/section_11/section_99/p_5.
21 Ibid.
22 Nabi Abdullaev, "New 'Just Russia' Party Says Putin Knows Best," The St. Petersbug Times, October 31, 2006,
http://www.times.spb.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=19303, (accessed March 16, 2010).
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comes closest to representing European liberalism. It typically supports a more dovish foreign
policy and has called for membership in the European Union, having asserted that  Russia is
culturally a European country.23 Like most liberally-oriented parties its platform calls  for the
inviolability of personal property, competition in both economics and politics, the strengthening
of democratic institutions, the supremacy of the law. It has traditionally been stronger in larger
cities and amongst the better educated.24 It's liberal platform on individual rights and a separation
of governmental power was mirrored to a certain degree by the now defunct party Union of
Right  Forces,  though the  latter  was less  enthusiastic  about  wealth  redistribution.25 Currently
under the leadership of Sergei Mitrokhin, Yabloko is threatened with political extinction, having
lost all representation in the Duma following the 2007 elections. 
The  Liberal  Democratic  Party  of  Russia  (hereafter  LDPR)  represents  the  last  of  the
traditionally important opposition parties. The name is something of a misnomer, since the party
is anything if  not  liberally orientated and has been depicted as supporting a far-right,  quasi-
fascist platform,26 while others have depicted the LDPR as advocating what might be called an
"empire-restorer"  type  of  nationalism.27 The  party  is  led  by  the  pugnacious  and  bombastic
Vladimir Zhirivnovski, a unique figure in the world of politics who is not above throwing water
on or even threatening to have his bodyguards threaten personal opponents. In addition to calling
for the restoration of Russia's "natural borders" (to include Ukraine, Belarus, parts of Central
Asia,  and  even  Alaska),  Zhirinovski  has  recommended  the  support  of  Islam as  a  means  of
weakening the U.S. and Western Christianity.28 Accordingly, Zhirinovsky has, unlike Yabloko,
23 White, 86-87.
24 Hutcheson, 23-24.
25 White, 87.
26 Ibid.
27 Sven Gunnar, Nationalism and the Russian Political Spectrum," 273.
28 White, 88.
7
asserted that Russia is not part of Europe, but rather an "independent civilization." It's official
platform  goes  further,  insisting  that  anything  borrowed  from  the  West  cannot  naturally  be
assimilated in Russia due to the idiosyncratic nature of its civilization and history, adding that
part of its purpose is to rescue Russia from its "democratic hangover."29  The LDPR has been
traditionally stronger in the north and east, largely amongst uneducated males in rural regions.30
Despite  strong  results  in  Duma  elections  following  the  fall  of  the  Soviet  Union,  LDPR's
popularity has significantly declined since 1993.
1.3 TABLES
Table 1.1 Russia's Major Political Parties31
Party Government Control
of the Economy
Welfare State Cooperation
with West/U.S.
Personal
Freedom
United
Russia
Center Center Center Center
CPRF Far Left Far Left Right Center
LDPR Left Left Far Right Right
Yablako Right Right Left Left
Fair Russia Left Left Center Center
29 LDPR, http://www.ldpr.ru/partiia.
30 Hutcheson, 22.
31 In this chart I take "left" to mean that position on the political spectrum which is generally for more government
control in the economy and less government interference in personal liberties. "Right" should be understood to
be the very opposite. 
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CHAPTER 2
VOTIG I RUSSIA 
2.1 THE ISSUE OF FALSIFICATION
As already mentioned, opposition leaders, area analysts, and other politicians in Russia
have accused the Kremlin of having a hand in falsifying election results. Writing for  Foreign
Policy in 2009, Lilia Shevtsova of The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace asserts, for
example,  that  Nicolas  Sarkozys  comments  about  the  Kremlin  imply  a  tacit  approval  for
"manipulated elections."32 Dmitri Simes and Paul Saunders agree, claiming that the democratic
parties in Russia are partially burdened by "electoral manipulation."33 
Of particular notoriety has been the local Duma and mayoral elections of October 2009, a
n  event  in  Russian  politics  so  controversial  that  three  of  Russia's  opposition  parties,  which
typically  end  up  falling  in  line  with  Kremlin  policies,  walked  out  of  parliament  in  protest.
Nikoai Petrov, for example, asserts that "the real picture" of the election is "without a doubt" not
reflected in the official returns.34 The Kremlin's alleged tactic, according to his analysis, consists
in  honestly  reporting  the  first  25%  or  so  of  election  returns,  while  the  remaining  are
indiscriminately attributed to United Russia.35  Writing in The St. Petersburg Times, Konstantin
Sonin similarly decries the Kremlin for flagrant falsification in the 2009 Moscow Duma election.
Major  discrepancies  found  between  two  districts  in  Moscow  show,  so  he  argues,  the
unmistakeable sign of falsification: whereas district 160, for example, reported a paltry turnout
of 18.3 percent with  United Russia receiving a modest  32.6% of the returns,  in district  161
32 Lilia Shevtsova, "The Kremlin Kowtow."
33 Dimitri K. Simes and Paul J. Sanders, "The Kremlin Begs to Differ."
34 Nikolai Petkov, "Digging Their Own Graves at Polls."
35 Ibid.
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turnout was reported to be 94.6%, with a 77.8% win for United Russia: the evidence for fraud
according to him thus lies  partially in the the suspiciously high turnout.36 Chairman of  Fair
Russia Sergei Mironov has also slammed United Russia for forging votes in several regional
elections of October 2009.37
In support of the those who argue for significant falsification, it should be pointed out that
a  rather  large  number of ordinary Russians are also skeptical  of  the legitimacy of elections.
Upwards of 75% of supports of LDPR and KPRF felt that seats in the Moscow Duma elections
of October 2009 had been predetermined and that members of the electoral commission simply
closed their eyes to falsification.38 Somewhat more ambiguous is the fact that even 44% of those
who supported United Russia indicated that there was no real competition to the elections39 Since
these  were  supporters  of United  Russia,  this  seems  to  either  imply  the  belief  in  major
falsification or the observation that United Russia is so strong no other party can reasonably
compete with it.  
A much  more  nuanced  picture,  however,  can  be  ascertained  through  various  opinion
polls. As far as the 2009 election for Moscow's Duma is concerned, for example, only 17% of
those polled  felt  that  serious  falsifications  had taken place,  with  a  relative majority of  48%
denying any sort of falsification and 35% unable to answer.40 Similarly, only 11% of respondents
claimed  to  have  experienced  any  sort  of  pressure  to  vote  one  way  or  the  other  by  local
36 Konstantin Sonin, "Falsification Par Excellence," The St. Petersburg Times, http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?
action_id=2&story_id=30128, (accessed March 12, 2010).
37 "Litsom k Litsu," Radio Svoboda, March 7, 2010,
http://www.svobodanews.ru/archive/ru_bz_ftf/latest/896/110.html (accessed March 10, 2010).
38 Levada Centre, "Monitoring Elektoral'nyx Predpochtenij na Vyborax 2009 goda v Moskovskuyu
Gorodskovckuyu Dumu," http://www.levada.ru/press/2009122501.html.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
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institutions, supervisors, or any others.41 In fact, voter satisfaction with the results of the Moscow
Duma  elections  grew  considerably  from  December  2005  to  October  2009:  those  who  felt
satisfied with the results increased from 29% to 42%, while those who were unsatisfied dropped
from 32% to 26% (those  who were unable to answer dropped slightly from 39% to 35%).42 
It  should  be  emphasized at  this  point  that  there  is  little  reason  to  doubt  that  limited
falsification takes place in some locations in Russia. There are indeed several examples since the
collapse of the Soviet Union. In the 1996 presidential election the CPRF candidate Gennady
Ziuganov won 38.3% of the vote in Tartarstan, only to see his real percentage paradoxically drop
in the second round to 32.3%.43 In the 2000 presidential election, Vladimir Shevchuk, head of the
Tartarstan Elections Press Center admitted that in fact some votes were bought for Putin.44 
Moreover,  data  collected  during  the  2008 Presidential  Elections  indicate  suspiciously
different numbers of eligible voters within a very short amount of time--the point being that in
districts where the second count of eligible voters indicated a decrease in that number, votes that
were eventually cast for non-Medvedev candidates were purged; on the other hand, the extra
votes were allegedly attributed to Medvedev in districts in which it was reported that the number
of eligible voters had increased.45 According to the Inter-Regional Union of Voters, in twenty-
three regions of Moscow voter turnout rates were reported to be as suspiciously high as (+ 95%)
in the presidential election. Moreover, ninety-five percent of all votes in supplementary turnouts
went  to  Medvedev,  instead of  being split  among the major  candidates  as  one would expect
statistically.  The independent electoral  observational  association Golos contends that multiple
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Steven Fish, Democracy Derailed, 33.
44 Ibid., 42-43.
45 Mezhregional'niia Obshchestvennaia Organizatsiia Sodejstviia Realizatsii Izberatel'nyx Prav,
http://www.votas.ru.
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accounts of voter fraud were captured on camera in Moscow, as well as Rostov Oblast.46 They
assert, for example, that some officials were actually awarded if falsification was detected in the
regions.47 
These claims are backed up by computer scientist Sergei Shipilkin's statical analysis of
the 2008 Presidential  Election. The results of his analysis, similar to what the Inter-Regional
Union of Voters' examination pointed to, indicate unexplainable results for Medvedev in districts
where turnout was unusually high.48 At the highest turnout levels support for Medvedev spiked at
levels oddly ending in either 0 or .5.  The conclusion is that it is statistically improbable that
these sort of results would occur without interference.  
We are left then at something of an impasse.  There is no shortage of those who agree that
elections have been tarnished by voter fraud in favor of United Russia or any candidate that the
party endorses. On top of this, there is indeed evidence of at least some falsification in the past,
in  particular  in  the  Caucasus  and  Tartarstan.  Several  questionnaires  also  indicate  that  a
significant  number of  Russians doubt the veracity and competitiveness  of elections.  I  argue,
however, that what evidence there is of fraud does not show that the majority of Russians do not
support Putin, Medvedev, and United Russia, nor does it show that any of these three would not
be elected by a solid majority in major national elections without any fraud. Shilipkin's statistical
analysis  of  the  2008  Presidential  Election,  for  example,  concluded  that  even  if  the  alleged
fraudulent votes were removed, Medvedev would still have captured 63% of the vote (instead of
70%)--enough to preclude a runoff. The various opinions of voters at this point in our analysis is
46 Golos, "Vybory v Rossii 11 Oktiabri 2009 Goda," http://www.golos.org/IMG/pdf/Doklad_GOLOS_11-10-
2009.pdf (accessed March 12, 2010): 111.
47 Ibid., 98.
48 Tony Halpin, "Dmitri Medvedev Votes Were Rigged, Says Computer Boffin," Times Online,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article3768223.ece, (accessed March 18, 2010).
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not satisfactorily uniform to argue conclusively one way or the other. Moreover, since these two
phenomena (falsification and voter satisfaction) seem mutually inconsistent, more evidence must
be brought to bare on the problem at hand.   
 In order to better analyze claims of falsification, I turn to data from elections in order to
cast  more  light  on  the  plausibility  of  the  hypothesis  that  falsification  occurs  in  significant
amounts. I first illustrate the results of national Duma elections in order to show the suspicious
rise in popularity of United Russia.  I  then turn to the highly controversial  local  elections of
October 2009. The goal in this section is to compare the results of cities where elections were
accused  of  being  fixed  (e.g.  Moscow)  with  those  where  there  was  little  or  no  controversy.
Finally, I compare these results with the results of local and regional elections which took place
in March of 2010, since these were generally viewed to be more honest. The obvious assumption
is  that  similar  support  for  United Russia candidates in local  and regional  elections validates
(within reasonable assumptions) results for United Russia in major national elections and thus
militates against claims of falsification (at least of a wide-spread, significant nature). 
I admit at least two caveats to the analysis: the data is not presented in any statistical
context, but rather is meant to provide a general impression of the degree to which Russians
support United Russia from city to city; furthermore, there is no a priori reason to assume that
the returns in one electoral district should mirror those of another (just as there is no reason, for
example, to assume that the results of Houston will match those of Boston in U.S. elections).
With that in mind, I compare voting across many districts in order to provide a general picture. 
 Table 2.1 shows that United Russia gained drastically in popularity by late 2007 and
serves as an illustration of the sort of increased support that many find suspicious. The data also
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point  to voter abandonment of the CPRF in droves and the near extinction of Yabloko. The
roughly 25% increase in proportional returns was suspicious enough to motivate the European
Commission to urge the Kremlin to examine claims of voter fraud.49 Indeed, even 50% of those
polled by the Levada Centre in March of 2007 felt that the counting of votes for the Duma would
be done dishonestly.50
While it is true that the Kremlin has exercised near hegemonic control in the realm of
Russian politics, through its tightening control over much of the mass media, intimidation, and
the manipulation of electoral laws, which has thus giving the party an unfair advantage in almost
any election, the point in question is whether there is substantive evidence of wide scale voter
falsification significant enough to have altered election results, and alone this increase is prima
facie insufficient. 
In defense of the legitimacy of these first numbers for the national Duma, for example, it
might  somewhat naively be pointed out that United Russia's share of the vote in 2003 (37.6 %)
is almost the same as the combined results of Unity and FAR in 2000 (36.6%). This is interesting
since United Russia was formed through the combination of both Unity and FAR.  And as far as
the precipitous fall in popularity of the KPRF,  is concerned, it has been argued that CPRF's
disappointing performance, beginning in 2003, is to be blamed mostly on economic performance
in the country, and not interference by the Kremlin.51  However, while this might lend some
credibility to the legitimacy of the 2004 Duma elections, it does little to explain the apparent
huge jump in popularity for United Russia in 2007. 
 Before examining the data, it is worth mentioning that a more damaging case against the
49 "EU Calls on Russia to Answer Election Criticism," Forbes.com, December 4, 2007,
http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2007/12/04/afx4401951.html (accessed March 20, 2010).
50 Levada Centre, http://www.levada.ru/vybory2007.html.
51 Laverty, 372.
14
assertion of substantial falsification can be made by comparing the returns for United Russia
with  approval  for  the  party  during  the  time  of  the  elections.  Interestingly,  United  Russia's
November results for the 2007 Duma election (which occurred in December of that year) of
64.3% corresponds  closely  to  its  approval  rating  of  66% in  November  (polling  results  for
November are given provided since results for the month of December were not collected until
after the election).52 In fact, approval for United Russia had steadily climbed through 2007 from
a low of 49% in January to a slightly higher 67% in October.53 The other correlation for the other
parties is not far off either. The CPRF's return of 11.6% is very close to it's November approval
rating of 12%, the LDPR's share of 8.1% is almost identical to its 8.0%  rating, Fair Russia's
7.74% is close to its 6%, and Yabloko's return of 1.0% is not far from its 2.0% approval rating.54 
The crucial test at this point is to compare voting result-approval rating correspondences
with  the  2003  Duma election.  I  submit  that  a  similar  trend,  wherein  party  approval  rating
accurately predicts voting returns, argues against the claim of major falsification and places a
greater burden of proof on those arguing such to produce more substantive evidence. In fact, the
correspondence with the 2003 Duma election is less accurate than the correspondence between
the 2007 Duma election and polls at the time, though it does predict a similar picture: United
Russia claimed 37.6% of the vote in December of 2003, but had an approval rating of roughly
30% in November of 2003. The Union of Right Forces return of 4.0% is close to its approval
rating of 6.0%, while the LDPR's 11.45% of the vote is not too distant from is then approval
rating of 8%.55 The real outlier is the KPRF, which had an approval rating of 23% at the time, but
52 Levada Centre, "Rejtingi Partij za 2007 god," http://www.levada.ru/reitingi2007.html.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Levada Centre, "Rejtingi Partij po Mesyatsam," http://www.levada.ru/reitingi.html.
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inexplicably took only12.61% of the vote.56 The correspondence between approval rating and
voting results is therefore not quite as precise for 2003 as it is for 2007, but the relationship is on
the whole the same.
Since this sort of evidence alone may be insufficiently compelling, I now turn to results
for the controversial October 11, 2009 city Duma elections. The purpose of this section is both to
examine any general inconsistencies that would suggest falsification at the local level, as well as
expose  considerable  discrepancies  between  support  for  United  Russia  in  national  and  local
elections.  The  hypothesis  here  is  that  considerably and  consistently  less  support  for  United
Russia  at  the local  level  suggests,  ceteris  paribus,  that  very high support  for  United Russia
candidates at the national level should be called into question. 
Table 2.2 lists the district results of the first three major regions of the of the Moscow
Duma election. These results reveal that returns like those mentioned earlier, where support for
United Russia eclipsed 70%, are the exception to the rule. To be sure, support for United Russia
varies roughly between 45% and 65%. One one must  exercise caution,  however,  in drawing
specific conclusions, since, as the table illustrates, in some races United Russia candidates ran
against  several  competing  candidates  (which  naturally  reduces  the  total  support  for  United
Russia) while in other races only two or three candidates competed. Furthermore, there is no
reason to assume that the results of one region should necessarily closely correspond to the next.
We must admit to agnosticism therefore, as to whether there is anything of concern in the 20-30
gap in support for United Russia between regions within a single city.  We may, nonetheless,
tentatively conclude that regions two and three of Table 2.2 contain rather suspicious results,
since United Russia captured over 70% of the returns and five candidates ran in each race. The
56 Ibid.
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vast majority of this sample, however, provides no obvious evidence of falsification.
To further test the legitimacy of these results I now turn to the city Duma elections for the
cities of Irkutsk and Kurgansk, found in Table 2.3 and 2.4. These data on the whole do not appear
to differ markedly from the Moscow Duma results. Once again, United Russia candidates won
almost every single race. These races do contain a few districts with suspiciously high results for
United Russia, such as districts seven, nine, and fourteen in the Irkutsk election and districts 21
and 25 in the Kurgansk election, but by and large the data parallel those of Moscow, save the fact
that here an independent, Fair Russia, or CPRF candidate did in fact win the occasional seat.
Crucially,  there does not seem to be noticeably less evidence of falsification, which  in turn
would (given our background assumptions) argue against claims that the Moscow Duma election
was riddled with fraud. As in the Moscow elections, the number of competitors varied between
local contests, which partially explains the range in support for United Russia candidates. 
As a final  comparison I  compare data from the March 14, 2010 city Duma elections
found in Table 2.5 and 2.6. This is arguably the best test yet, since analysts such as Nikolai
Petkov of  the Carnegie Endowment  for  International  Peace called these elections  "relatively
honest"  in contrast to the October 2009 elections.57 The results of these elections do show a few
differences with those of October 2009. For example, in no district in the Ivanovo election did a
United  Russia  candidate  win  60% or  more  of  the  vote.  Nonetheless,  the  general  picture  is
roughly the same, especially in view of United Russia's virtual sweep of both elections. If we are
generous to the falsification hypothesis and assume that the results of the 2010 elections are a
more accurate picture of support for United Russia in the country we could say that in the worst
57 Nikolai Petkov, "March Elections: United Voting Day in Russia," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
http://www.carnegie.ru/en/news/84231.htm.
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case a modest amount of fraudulent votes were added to the 2009 elections. But perhaps even
this gives the falsification too much. Note, for example, that there are few obvious differences
between the Kurgansk city duma election of 2009 and the regional election for the Kurgansk
regional election of 2010. The essential difference may lie in the city of Ivanovo itself. 
Having compared these results in an admittedly non-rigorous way, it nonetheless seems
safe to say that a strong majority of voters cast their vote in favor of United Russia.  I argue that
there  is  insufficient  evidence  that  the  Moscow  Duma  election  of  2009  was  not  a  general
reflection of the will of those who cast their votes. Extrapolating from these local elections, I
submit that it is reasonable to conclude that United Russia in fact legitimately won the 2007
national Duma election; the 63.40% it supposedly captured does not seem to be unrealistic, and
if  judged  against  the  results  of  2010  Ivanovo election,  was at  worse  probably only slightly
inflated. Furthermore, I argue that it is unlikely that the Kremlin would have the time or have
gone to the trouble to falsify hundreds of district races, and if it had, it is unlikely it would have
randomly allowed for wins for CPRF or Fair Russia, for example. 
I have, admittedly, provided no knock-down argument against falsification at the local or
national  level.  The  data  presented  above  do  not  present  a  perfectly  clear  picture,  since  no
statistical analysis of the results is performed. This is compounded somewhat by the ambiguity of
support for Untied Russia in some races, since the number of competing candidates at times
varies sharply from district to another. Moreover, comparing the results of different cities ignores
other potential factors, such as varying support for the CPRF across regions, which would ideally
need to be controlled for. However, since most of the local elections that took place in October of
2009 were not repeated in March of 2010, there are few options aside from comparing different
18
cities  against  one  another,  or  comparing  different  types  of  elections  in  the  same  city.
Nonetheless,  this  general  snapshot  of  Russian  voting trends  illustrates  that  little  if  anything
immediately jumps out which might suggest significant falsification. 
2.2 POLL RESULTS 
The argument that the majority of Russians support  United Russia candidates in national
elections,  including  the  2008  Presidential  Election,  can  be  strengthened  by  the  detailed
examination of opinion polls. In examining the average Russian approval of Putin/Medvedev and
United Russia I  draw upon polling data conducted by, the Russian Public Opinion Research
Center (VCIOM), the Foundation for Public Opinion, and the Levada Centre, the founder of
which often appears as a guest on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (arguably the radio station
most  critical  of  the Kremlin).  Results  from both the  Levada  Centre  and the Russian  Public
Opinion Research Center, moreover, are widely relied upon by the Center for the Study of Public
Policy at the University of Aberdeen.
The results of nearly every relevant poll point to extremely high approval rates of both
Putin and Medvedev--almost 80%--as well as general trust in the intentions and capabilities of
the government.58 One recently taken poll,  moreover, suggests that  Putin would easily be re-
elected were he to run again for president.59 Medvedev, similarly, would be re-elected if pitted
against any other non-Putin candidates in a presidential election.60 When asked to what degree
they trust their politicians, 58% claim to trust Medvedev, with 26% saying they partially trust
58 Levada Centre, "Odobrenie i Doverie," http://www.levada.ru/prezident.html.
59 Center for the Study of Public Policy University of Aberdeen, "Voting Behaviour-Presidency,"
http://www.russiavotes.org/president/presidency_vote_preferences.php.
60 Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM), "Electoral'nyj Rejting Politikov (s Iyunya 2008),"
http://wciom.com/news/ratings/electoral-rating-of-political-leaders.html.
19
him, and only 13% professing distrust; 64% say they trust Putin, with 21% saying only partially,
and only 12% not trusting him.61 Furthermore, Putin and Medvedev are also the most improved
politicians in terms of popularity. When asked for which politicians their opinion had improved
in the last month, 17% and 16% listed Putin and Medvedev (respectively)--roughly 10% higher
than number three Zhirinovski.62
United Russia more or less maintains its high popularity demonstrated in the previous
section. It is, for example, the overwhelmingly the popular choice for theoretical Duma elections
at 54% were they to be held today according to the Russian Public Opinion Research Center63
and 51% according to the Obshchestvennyj Fond, roughly 40 points higher than the second most
popular party KPRF.64 Interestingly, one poll shows that the KPRF, which 7% responded they
would support ranks far behind those who said they would vote for no one (19%) and those who
were  unsure  how to  answer  (11%).65 This  decline  in  the  popularity  of  the  KPRF,  sans  the
noticeable increase in support  for any other opposition party,  implies strong if  not  increased
support for United Russia. 
Furthermore, the results go on to suggest that Russian approval of Putin and his party is
logically consistent with other beliefs and cannot be attributed to, say, misleading questions or
voter  indifference.  That  is  to  say,  approval  for  Putin  and  Medvedev  correctly  predicts  a
corresponding lack of approval for other parties and their candidates. Indeed, those polled not
only express approval for United Russia but also strong disapproval for other parties and their
61 Fond Obshchestvennoe Mnenie, "Politicheskie Indikatory: Prezident," http://bd.fom.ru/pdf/d09ind10.pdf. 
62 Fond Obshchestvennoe Mnenie, "Otnoshenie k Politikam," http://bd.fom.ru/pdf/d09polit10.pdf.
63 Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM), "Electoral Rating of Parties,"
http://wciom.com/news/ratings/electoral-rating-of-political-parties.html.
64 Fond Obshchestvennoe Mnenie, "Politicheskie Indikatory: Prezident," http://bd.fom.ru/pdf/d09ind10.pdf. 
65 Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM), "Electoral Rating of Parties,"
http://wciom.com/news/ratings/electoral-rating-of-political-parties.html.
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candidates. When polled by the Levada Centre as to which party they would never consider
supporting, the largest number of respondents confessed to never being able to consider voting
for LDPR, followed by the CPRF and Yablako.66 In fact, United Russia was second only to Fair
Russia (out of six) in the list of most detested parties.67 Similarly, in February of 2008 the Levada
Centre showed that Medvedev was the least hated candidate, while the relative majority (44%) of
respondents professed to under no circumstances being able to consider voting for A. Bagdanov
(incidentally,  the  most  liberally-minded  candidate),  followed by 43% who felt  the  same for
Zhirinovsky.68 
Moreover, opinion polls reveal that approval for Putin not can not be explained as support
for Putin  qua the office of the president or prime minister. While the president has maintained
large approval ratings, it is of particular interest to note that the office of prime minister trailed
the office of the president tremendously in approval by roughly 40-50 points from the beginning
of 2005 to early 2008--that is, during the time that Putin was president. However, shortly after
Medvedev was elected president in 2008 and Putin was almost immediately appointed  prime
minister,  approval  ratings  for  the latter  office soared;  approval,  in  fact,  rose  high enough to
slightly eclipse that of the president.69 Yet another poll concerning confidence in political leaders
shows that Putin again edges out Medvedev.70 
Given  the  above  results,  I  submit  that  it  is  even  less  likely  that  claims  of  major
falsification hold water. Conservatively we can at least say the following: if these polls are even
66 Levada Centre, http://www.levada.ru/vybory20074.html.
67 Ibid.
68 Levada Centre, http://www.levada.ru/vybory20080.html
69 Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM), "Ratings of State Institutions,"
http://wciom.com/news/ratings/ratings-of-state-institutions.html
70 Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM), "Confidence in Political Leaders,"
http://wciom.com/news/ratings/confidence-in-political-leaders.html.
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close to being accurate then there is at least no reason for the Kremlin to engage in wide scale
voter fraud; why such risk-taking would be necessary when Putin, Medvedev, and their party
United Russia have enjoyed long-term consistent support by the people is another puzzle that
cannot be given more attention here. The data analyzed in Section 2.1, which pointed to relative
consistency between local and national elections, only strengthens this point. There is certainly
evidence credible enough for one to conclude that some falsification does take place, but it seems
now even more unlikely to be sufficient to truly alter the results of major elections. If, in fact, it
turns out that very large numbers of votes are consistently falsified then (assuming the general
reliability of the polling data mentioned here), the most sober conclusion may in fact be that
elections in Russia are over-determined; that  is,  total  votes for United Russia candidates are
illegally  inflated,  although  in  most  cases  those  candidates  would  be  elected  by  a  majority
anyway.
2.3 TABLES
Table 2.1. Russia's Duma Elections 
National
Duma
Election
United
Russia
CPRF LDPR Yablako Fair
Russia
Unity Fatherland- All Russia
1999 N/A 24.29% 6.00% 5.90% N/A 23.32% 13.30%
2003 37.60% 12.61% 11.45% 4.30% N/A N/A N/A
2007 64.30% 11.60% 8.10% 1.60% 7.74% N/A N/A
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Table 2.2. Moscow City Duma Elections (Oct. 2009)71
Region Winner Percentage of Votes
Won
Number of Parties
Competing
1 United Russia 60.95 5
2 United Russia 73.34 5
3 United Russia 72.47 5
4 United Russia 61.07 5
5 United Russia 63.55 5
6 United Russia 68.74 5
7 United Russia 60.34 5
8 United Russia 58.98 5
9 United Russia 68.72 5
10 United Russia 58.5 5
11 United Russia 52.86 6
12 United Russia 44.52 6
13 United Russia 58.61 6
14 United Russia 62.85 6
15 United Russia 52.35 6
16 United Russia 64.42 6
17 United Russia 51.52 6
18 United Russia 68.18 6
19 United Russia 60.93 6
20 United Russia 51.83 6
21 United Russia 52.68 5
22 United Russia 51.19 5
23 United Russia 63.39 5
24 United Russia 45.12 5
25 United Russia 54.45 5
26 United Russia 55 5
27 United Russia 64.18 5
71 Data from this table and all tables that follow are taken from Tsentral'naya Izberatel'naya Komissiya Rossijskoj
Federatsii, http://www.cikrf.ru.
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TABLE 2.3. Irkutsk City Duma Elections (Oct. 2009)
District Winner Percentage of Votes
Won
Number of Parties
Competing
1 United Russia 76.92 4
2 Fair Russia 50.11 6
3 United Russia 68.63 5
4 United Russia 64.86 4
5 United Russia 58.54 5
6 United Russia 34.51 4
7 United Russia 75.79 3
8 United Russia 53.02 3
9 United Russia 70.05 3
10 United Russia 33.65 5
11 United Russia 57.76 3
12 United Russia 49.14 4
13 United Russia 76.8 3
14 United Russia 75.61 2
15 United Russia 55.54 4
16 United Russia 59.42 4
17 Independent 37.51 5
18 United Russia 34.51 6
19 United Russia 51.41 3
20 United Russia 52.91 5
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TABLE 2.4. Kurgansk City Duma Elections (Oct. 2009)
District Winner Percentage of Votes
Won
Number of Parties
Competing
1 Independent 27.01 5
2 Untied Russia 63.87 4
3 United Russia 30.19 6
4 Independent 43.86 4
5 United Russia 50.22 5
6 United Russia 56.13 3
7 United Russia 49.57 5
8 United Russia 46.19 5
9 United Russia 44.24 4
10 United Russia 39.35 5
11 United Russia 38.7 4
12 United Russia 48.3 4
13 Independent 35.64 5
14 United Russia 51.17 3
15 United Russia 42.32 4
16 United Russia 53.2 4
17 United Russia 39.65 7
18 United Russia 61.3 3
19 United Russia 47.03 5
20 United Russia 38.54 4
21 United Russia 78.73 2
22 United Russia 44.27 4
23 United Russia 45.13 4
24 CPRF 37.73 4
25 United Russia 76.41 3
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TABLE 2.5. Ivanovo City Duma Elections (March, 2010)
District Winner Percentage of Votes
Won
Number of Parties
Competing
1 United Russia 44.52 5
2 United Russia 58.16 3
3 United Russia 50.7 4
4 United Russia 45.73 4
5 United Russia 45.48 4
6 United Russia 52.46 4
7 United Russia 44.97 4
8 United Russia 40.33 4
9 United Russia 50.33 4
10 United Russia 40.59 5
11 United Russia 47.79 5
12 United Russia 43.8 4
13 United Russia 48 4
14 United Russia 38.52 4
15 United Russia 52.59 4
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Table 2.6. Kurgansk Regional Duma Elections (March 2010)
1 United Russia 40.45 4
2 United Russia 29.65 5
3 CPRF 30.7 4
4 Fair Russia 40.99 3
5 N/A 33.67 4
6 United Russia 35.81 4
7 Fair Russia 30.5 4
8 United Russia 48.5 5
9 United Russia 52.7 5
10 United Russia 56.09 5
11 United Russia 72.6 3
12 United Russia 70.41 5
13 United Russia 60.82 3
14 United Russia 48.18 4
15 United Russia 54.37 5
16 United Russia 51.13 5
17 United Russia 51.63 5
18 United Russia 56.84 5
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CHAPTER 3 
POLITICS AD SOCIETY
3.1 RUSSIA UNDER PUTIN
The argument laid out at this point should obviously not be construed as implying that
elections in Russia are fair or that interference from the Kremlin is an illusion. Nor should they
be taken as an argument for Russia's status as a democracy. Far from it. The purpose thus far has
been to show that it is fairly likely that the results of national elections in 2007 and 2008, as well
as local elections of 2009, mean that the majority of voters actually pulled the lever, so to speak,
for United Russia. Beyond this, the political game in Russia is certainly not fair, and has grown
even less fair since the election of Putin to president in 2000.
Since coming to power, Putin has pushed through a myriad of policies that have stymied
what fledgling democracy there ever was in Russia. One of his first moves was to strengthen the
central government at the expense of growth in regional power under Yeltsin. Specifically, Putin
divided Russia  into  seven federal  okrugs with  each to be placed under  the supervision of  a
presidential envoy. He followed this with removal of the election of local governors, in addition
to granting the federal government the power to disband local legislatures.  Following the Beslan
Hostage crisis of 2004, Putin used the pretext of the "war on terror" to impose a new law calling
for the selection of regional executives by the president.72 Writing before the elections of 2007-
2008, Dmitri Trenin laid out the single supremacy of Putin in Russia:
[T]here is no question that [Russia] has a czarist political system, in which all major 
decisions are taken by one institution, the presidency, also known as the Kremlin. 
72 Darrell Slider, "Politics in the Regions," 179.
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The separation of powers, provided for under the 1993 constitution, is a fiction. All 
institutions of the federal government, from the cabinet to the bicameral legislature, 
are in reality mere agents of the presidency. The legal system is anything but 
independent, especially when dealing with opponents of the Kremlin...73
In  addition to exercising unchecked control,  Putin has altered important  electoral  laws since
coming to power such that it is now even more difficult for opposition parties to form coalitions
and win representation:  the minimum returns necessary for winning representation in the Duma
was raised from 5% to 7%, while the election of Duma deputies by single mandate races was
completely  eliminated.  This  last  aspect  is  particularly  cumbersome  given  the  weakness  of
political  parties  and  ideology in  Russia:  hopeful  parties  are  required  to  either  gain  200,000
signatures or deposit the equivalent of roughly $1.3 million to qualify for ballet access. Often
those parties and groups that do obtain the required number of signatures are disqualified under
suspicious circumstances. For example, the Central Election Committee rejected a number of the
2.5 million signatures collected by local chapters of Greenpeace to block the importation of spent
nuclear fuel.74  The Election Committee also overlooks the lack of any sort of monitoring system
for at-home voting practices--a clear violation of Russian laws on the secrecy of the ballot.75
On top of this is a politically weak civil society, where (as of 2005) less than one percent
of the population belongs to a political  party.76  Intimidation only worsens  the situation and
remains on the unofficial  list  of suppressive techniques:  beginning in 2003 and 2004 Putin's
government began, for example, the selective use of financial laws to imprison local governors.77
Political deception is also an element of control. The Kremlin has been widely accused of
73 Dmitri V. Trenin, Getting Russia Right, 9.
74 Steven Fish, Democracy Derailed, 44.
75 Ibid., 59-60.
76 Leon Aaron, Russia's Revolution, 238.
77 Slider, 179.
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creating faux left parties in order to create the specter of some sort of substantive opposition
parties and sap away the strength of genuine ones. As the most significant competitor to the party
of power in the 1990's, the CPRF's base of support was targeted by the Kremlin through the
latter's creation of the ideologically similar "dummy" party--the Pensioner's Party--as well as the
utilization of the party Rodina to siphon away support from nationalistic supporters.78 In fact, this
should come as little surprise, especially since earlier incarnations of United Russia--i.e. parties
of  power--were  created  by the  Kremlin:  Our  Home is  Russia,  for  example,  was  created  by
Kremlin elites in 1993 in order to create the semblance of a two-party system.79 On the other
hand, those who are fortunate enough to win the favor of the party of power apparently gain a
powerful ally: of 21 regional executives in 2003, candidates simply backed by United Russia
won in 19 districts; between January 2003 and January 2005 the success rate of United Russia-
backed candidates had increased to 35 out of 43 wins in some local elections.80  
Of monumental importance is Putin's control of many media outlets, some of which he
wrestled  from  independent  owners,  and  which  now give  the  Kremlin  a  virtual  government
monopoly in the realm of televised news. Vladimir Gusinksky, owner of the NTV station, in
particular drew the ire of the Kremlin for his station's critical portrayal of the war in Chechnya.81
As a result the government threatened him with criminal charges (ostensibly for tax reasons),
eventually forcing a change in ownership and the closing of Gusinksky's  magazine  Itogi and
newspaper  Segodnya.82 Incidentally,  Putin's  suppression  of  independent  media  prompted
Freedom House to downgrade Russia from "partially free" to "not free."83  Putin also canceled a
78 Laverty, 371-372.
79 Hutcheson, 15.
80 Konitzer, 225.
81 McFaul et. Al, 189.
82 Ibid.
83 White, 76.
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1991 decree which guaranteed the legal rights of  Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to
broadcast in Russia.84 To be fair, a fairly robust print media remains in tact in Russia, with a wide
selection of ideologically different newspapers available to Russians--including those that offer
frank criticisms of Putin; however, almost all Russians get their news from the state-owned t.v.
channels.85
Putin has also allegedly not been shy about targeting those outside the media who are
unfriendly to his agenda. The most famous case is surely the arrest of Mikhail Khodorovsky in
2003, one of Russia's most famous tycoons.  The CEO of the oil company YUKOS and a well-
known supporter of Yabloko, Khodorovsky was officially charged with tax violations. In addition
to being illegally denied bail in the course of his arrest, Khodorovsky's attorney's offices were
searched, while judges who attempted to objectively rule in the case were either dismissed or
replaced.86
This  sort  of  harassment  is,  however,  only  the  beginning.  Post-Soviet  Russia  has
unfortunately  become  a  dangerous  place  for  journalists  and  other  fighters  for  civil  rights.
Reporters Without Borders, for example, has named Russia, along with Algeria, "as the most
dangerous  countries  for  journalists."87 Among  other  things,  journalists  have  been  beaten  in
Primorskii Krai, Kaliningrad, Kirov, as have political challengers in Moscow.88 And contributing
to such an illiberal society, the Kremlin continues the Soviet practice of monitoring opposition
groups and political opponents.89
Putin's machinations notwithstanding, it must be pointed out that part of the explanation
84 Fish, 73.
85 Ibid.
86 Aaron, 243.
87 As cited in Fish, 70.
88 Fish, 68-69.
89 Ibid., 76.
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for Russia's poor transition to democracy lies in the unsatisfactory development of robust and
ideologically recognizable political parties. The data in table 3.1, for example, demonstrate the
underdeveloped nature of political parties at the regional level: 
While  the results  in  this  table  might  appear  at  first  to  indicate  a  strong showing for
independents, they are in fact a better indication of the relative weakness of the major national
parties at certain levels. In none of these races, for example, did a candidate from a non-United
Russia party win a seat. More disappointing is the fact that in few cases did an opposition party
even field a candidate. The data  do show the power and popularity of United Russia: in very few
of  these  elections  did  an  independent  defeat  a  United  Russian  candidate  (although Komi  is
something of an exemption).
One particular  problem,  which  has  contributed  to  the  lack  of  party development  but
which  perhaps Putin can personally be excused for, is the post-Soviet transfer of power to local
governors, who controlled an unfair amount of material resources crucial to the people.90 Since
much of previous Soviet power transfered to the hands of governors, at times they alone were
able to provide the relevant "electoral goods and services that theorists usually assume parties
provide."91 The privatization of powerful companies into the hands of small, concentrated groups
also began to significantly influence Russian politics by the late 1990s.92 The upshot, of course,
was additional stifling of the growth of independent parties. 
 The fragile system of political parties and underdeveloped civil society likely finds an
additional  explanation in Russia's cultural history, particularly the heavy burden communist rule
entails  for  democratization.  In  particular,  elections  in  Russia  have  by and  large  never  been
90 Henry E. Hale, "Why Not Parties?" 153.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., 154.
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democratically oriented, since the very first ones following the implementation of glasnost' were
aimed at gaining power as a means of tearing down the USSR; the result was that office seekers
were left  with little  incentive to build  democratic institutions.93 The implosion of  the Soviet
Union took  with  it  "the  social  cleavages  and  related social  infrastructure  that...give  birth  to
parties."94 The  present  Russian  institutions,  on  the  other  hand,  which  provide  inadequate
incentives  for  building parties,  along  with  insufficient  resources  available  to  potential  party
leaders  is  another burden.95 Most  parties  that  did end up taking form ended up being based
around the charisma of their leader, while many elites hand had no motivation to form parties at
all.96 All these points coalesce around the fact that that elections in the late Soviet Union were
implemented before substantive political parties and a strong civil society could be created. The
result was that the"electoral process" was never really "an actual goal of the political struggle."97
It is little wonder then that Russia's democratic transition has been so incomplete. 
The result of these various forces and historical legacy has been not only the continual
domination of a single party of power  (all too reminiscent of the Communist party of the Soviet
Union) with no transfer of power between ideologically competitive parties, but also a system in
which almost all  parties define themselves vaguely and at  times enact policies unpredictably
once elected. Data analyzed by Regina Smith, for example, shows that when several of the major
parties in Russia are assigned values based on the average of party member issue assessments
and then compared against one another, only the KPRF is truly distinguishable from all other
parties.98 For example, concerning economic issues, LDPR's leftist position is indistinguishable
93 McFaul et. al, 33.
94 Hale, 153. 
95 Ibid.
96 Stoner-Weiss, 141.
97 McFaul et. al, 33. 
98 Regina Smyth, "Strong Partisans, Weak Parties?" 216-218.
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from any of its competitors on the right; somewhat similarly, while SPS's economic ideology
distinguishes  it  from  rivals  on  the  left,  its  differences  with  fellow  center-right  parties  are
unrecognizable.99 Most interesting is the fact that Unity's political philosophy is not recognizably
different  from  any  other  party.100 The  logical  implication,  as  Smyth  argues,  is  that  "issue
positions are not likely to be good predictors of what the party will do in office."101
What may be worse is that the parties, in addition to being rarely distinguishable from
one another under the political microscope, are perhaps incoherent themselves. While the KPRF
and SPS are coherent on economic issues, with Yablako and Unity being somewhat coherent,
when all salient issues are combined all parties reach a coherency score that is dangerously close
to random--that is, incoherence.102 This analysis reveals that unfortunately the "placement of a
party's  position  on  one  issue  does  not  accurately  predict  their  placement  on  other  related
issues."103 
Although Putin has received most of the criticism so far, trends of run-away executive
power did not begin ex nihilo with the ascension of Putin to the presidency in 2000. The general
process at least to a certain degree finds its roots  in the reforms of Yeltsin in the early 1990's. It
was Yeltsin, to be sure, who, after illegally dissolving congress in September of 1993 (an act
which led to an attempt by congress to impeach him, not to mention a civil war), altered the the
nature of elections and the composition of parliament by decree. In a referendum on the new
constitution of 1993, which created what has been labeled a "super-presidential" system, Yeltsin
too was accused of falsifying the results.104 Nonetheless,  Yeltsin's party of power at the time
99 Ibid.
100Ibid.
101 Ibid., 218-219.
102 Ibid., 219-220.
103 Ibid.
104 As cited in McFaul et. al, 61.
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"Russia's Choice" was soundly defeated by Zhirivnovski's LDPR in the 1993 Duma elections.
Incidentally, if Yeltsin had no qualms about increasing executive power--by questionable means,
no less--yet allowed his party of support  to lose in the Duma elections, it is possible that Putin,
who has from one point of view simply continued the investment of power in the executive, may
not have had electoral results altered either. The implication here is once again that Putin does in
fact enjoy the support of  Russia. Indeed, in the 1999 Duma elections the party of power at the
time Unity did exceedingly well. And here no falsification need be entertained, since the party
clearly rode to success on the coattails of Putin's incredible popularity at the time in all sectors of
the  electorate.105 Indeed,  Putin's  popularity  has  not  only been  high  recently,  but  was  stable
enough in the early 2000s that there was almost no way, according to one analysis, that he could
lose a fair election in 2003 and 2004.106 
105 Hutcheson, 25-26.
106 McFaul et. al, 61, 75.
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3.2 Tables
TABLE 3.1  Regional Head Elections (March 2007)
Republic/Region/Oblast Seats Won By United Russia Seats Won By Independents
Belgorod - 1
Vologda - 2
Lipetsk 1 1
Moscow - 1
Murmansk - 1
Novogorod 1 1
Orel - 1
Pskov 1 -
Samara - 1
Sverdlovsk - 1
Tver 1 -
Tomsk - 1
Yaroslavl 1 -
Koryak - 1
Khanty-Mansisk - 1
Yamalo-Nenetsk 2 -
Perm - 2
Republic of Adygeia - 4
Republic of Buriatia - 2
Republic of Dagestan 1 4
Republic of Komi 4 9
Republic of Yakutia - 4
Republic of Khakasia 3 3
Altajsk Kraj - 3
Krasnodar Kraj - 2
Primorskij Kraj - 2
Stavropol'skij Kraj - 2
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CHAPTER 4
CIVIC CULTURE
4.1 ATTITUDES TOWARDS DEMOCRACY
Curiously,  despite the authoritarian nature of his rule Putin's  popularity has oddly not
been  affected.,  nor  does  it  seem  to  encourage  Russians  to  view  Russia  as  any  less  of  a
democracy. Listening to Radio Free Liberty, it is not all uncommon to hear people in response to
the question "Which of the major parties do you consider to be the most democratic?" gleefully
reply "United Russia!"
 An  explanation  for  the  popularity  behind  Putin  and  United  Russia  is  made  more
confusing by data which imply that most Russians do not feel the government is on their side,
nor do they seem to have a strong attachment to the electoral process in Russia. For example,
from 2000 to 2004 confidence in the president went from 45% to 62%-- incidentally, more than
confidence in the church, army, media, etc.107 During the same time-frame Russians were polled
about Putin's removal of the popular election of governors and republican presidents. While the
initial reaction was arguably negative,  it  turned out that Russians were largely indifferent: of
those polled 29% felt it was a positive move, 37% negative, and 35% were unsure--only months
later those who regarded the move as positive had jumped to 36%, with 35% undecided, and
29% negative.108 Another figure put the overall approval for Putin's decision at 44%  vs 42%
disapproval.109  
Similarly,  when  asked  whether  the  minimum percentage  needed  for  a  party  to  gain
107 Ibid., 90.
108As cited in Konitzer, 6-7.
109 Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, "Why Was Democracy Lost in Russia's Regions?," 364.
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representation in the national Duma should be lowered (from 7% to the previous 5%) 33%  of
those polled answered "no," while a surprisingly large 37% responded that they were unsure.
While  the  first  number  could  be  partially  attributable  to  fervent  United  Russian  supporters
hoping to maintain control of the Duma through their party as much as possible, it is puzzling
that roughly a third of the country would not have an opinion on the matter.
On the other hand, civil rights and freedoms are largely greater than they were during the
Soviet Union. In fact, there is much more freedom in present Russia at the level of individual
liberties than one might glean from the previous section. While the previous section focused on
the authoritarian nature under Putin's rule, the authoritarian thrust of his Kremlin, from another
point of view, extends primarily to the area of political opponents, media outlets, and members of
the  nouveau  riche deemed  unfriendly  to  the  Kremlin.  Since  pre-perestroika Soviet  Union,
Russians have gained significant individual rights outside the arena of politics. To be sure, unlike
his counterpart of the early 1980's and before, the contemporary citizen of  Russia has the right
to travel beyond the country's borders, listen to whatever music he pleases, dress however he
likes, work wherever he likes, open a business, etc. Moreover, these freedoms have remained
basically the same ever since the fall of the Soviet Union.  As of 2005, 77% of Russians polled
reported that they feel freer now than under the Soviet system.110 In fact, between 1992 and 2005,
the perception of newly gained freedoms have increased support for the Putin Regime by 14-17
points.111 
From another point of view, one cannot overlook the potential role that general apathy
towards politics plays, which would further explain why the expanding nature of the Kremlin
110 Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Neil Munro, Russia Transformed, 169.
111 Ibid., 181.
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under Putin has perhaps had little effect on the Russian approval rates. Over seventy years of
autocratic  rule  under  communism,  so  the  argument  goes,  has  arguably  left  the  majority  of
Russians indifferent towards politics in general:
Russia is still an autocracy, presided over by a czarist president. His subjects show little 
interest in politics and will ratify the leader's choice of a successor, whoever the 
candidate is...Most Russians want to be left alone by the state. They do not bother and do 
not want to be bothered. They leave politics, i.e. clan struggle, to their nominal leaders, 
as they go about their own business.112 
This  sort  of  attitude at  least  seems to  be  reflected in  the roughly quarter  or  third  of  polled
respondents who are unsure how to respond to what one might presume to be political questions
whose answer should be at least easy if not obvious. This phenomenon is arguably reflected in
attitudes towards Russia's political parties. For example, that political parties are weak in Russia
does  not  seem to be a major  concern for the majority oft  Russians.  Only 39% partially are
entirely  in  agreement  that  the  role  of  parties  should  be  increased.  Forty  percent  somewhat
disagreed or entirely disagreed, with 22% not knowing how to respond.113 
Having addressed the issue individual liberties, the relevant question now becomes this:
assuming the legitimacy of all relevant indicators, does support for Putin, Medvdev, etc. entail
indifference towards democracy, given the explicitly undemocratic deeds of Putin's Kremlin; or,
on the other hand, do Russians simply value issues such as an improved economy, for example,
above the strengthening of democratic institutions so much so that the former masks real support
on the ground for democracy? 
Unfortunately,  some  poll  results  paint  a  potentially  confusing  picture.  We  saw,  for
112 Trenin, 104.
113 Levada Centre, "Obshestvennoe Mnenie 2009," http://www.levada.ru/sborniki.html.
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example, that opinion polls did a fairly good job of predicting the contested Duma elections of
2007. At the same time, polls conducted through the same organization showed that roughly half
of the country felt the 2007 Duma election would not be conducted fairly.114 Fifty-eight percent
said  the  same  concerning  the  2008  presidential  elections.115 Does  this  indicate  indifference
towards the government forging votes? Is dissatisfaction with falsification per se simply masked,
since the forging of votes just so happens to be in favor of the party the majority supports? Or is
it  the case that  those who would otherwise disapprove of  alleged falsification reward Putin,
Medvedev, etc. for what the latter have provided since 2000? In short, does Russia care about
honest elections and the democratic process?
When  asked  directly  about  democracy,  the  majority  of  Russians  are  not  necessarily
opposed to it, although support for it is not as strong as one might hope. Fifty-six percent of
those  polled  by  the  Levada  Centre  responded  that  Russia  does  indeed  need  democracy.116
Similarly,  a  relative  majority  of  49% responded  in  favor  for  the  right  to  freedom  of  self-
expression,  while 32% responded that  only the courts should be able to decide what sort  of
opinions can be voiced and under what conditions they can be punished.117 On the other hand,
despite huge levels  of support  for  Medvedev prior  to the elections,  an almost  equal  number
(73%)  of  those  polled  felt  that  Medvedev  should  indeed  have  participated  alongside  other
candidates in the presidential debates.118
Perhaps, then, it is more revealing to ask whether democracy entails something different
to  the  average  Russian worldview.  Interestingly,  support  for  a  democratic  government  drops
114 Levada Centre, http://www.levada.ru/vybory2007.html.
115 Levada Centre, http://www.levada.ru/vybory20080.html.
116 Levada Centre, "Obshestvennoe Mnenie 2009," http://www.levada.ru/sborniki.html.
117 Ibid.
118 Levada Centre, http://www.levada.ru/vybory20080.html.
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precipitously depending on how it is framed. Since February of 2005, for example a Western-
style democracy has ranked as the lowest of three theoretical types of government in Russia.119 In
February of 2009, 38% reported that a Soviet-style government would be best of all, while 25%
opted for the present system; a mere 18% felt that Russia needed a political system in line with
the Western democracies.120 Incidentally,  this association with the West may partially explain
why one poll showed that 24% of Russians were opposed to democracy.121 When asked directly
"What  is  Democracy  to  you"  the  answer  "Economic  prosperity"  (39%)  slightly  edged  out
"Freedom of speech, press, and religion" (38%).122 
William Mishler and John P. Willerton cite evidence that democratic values have indeed
taken shape, at least insofar as one reads this as implying that Russians believe they have the
right to hold their leaders accountable for what they do or do not accomplish.123 This, though, is
not exactly what is at stake. The question that intrigues us is whether Russians uniquely evaluate
their government due to some idiosyncratic aspect of Russian culture or whether they value the
democratic  ideals  usually  tacitly  assumed  to  go  hand-and-hand  with  a  liberal  democratic
government. In addressing this question Mishler and Willerton find that, while Russians seem to
possess a different set of values (even perhaps evaluating their leaders along different lines that
Western  countries),  by and  large  Russian  support  for  elected  leaders  is  strongly tied  to  the
economy and consumer prices, as in the West, and Russians, furthermore, reward their leaders
for peace and prosperity.124 
119 Levada Centre, "Obshestvennoe Mnenie 2009," http://www.levada.ru/sborniki.html.
120 Ibid.
121 Richard Gaplin, "Stalin's New Status in Russia," BBC News, December 27, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7798497.stm (accessed December 15, 2009).
122Levada Centre, "Obshestvennoe Mnenie 2009," http://www.levada.ru/sborniki.html.
123 William Mishler and John P. Willerton, "The Dynamics of Presidential Popularity in Post-Communist Russia,"
117.
124 Ibid., 131, 134.
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4.2. THE ELEMENT OF AUTHORITARIANISM
If  support  for the regime does not  entail  a disregard for democracy, what,  then,  does
determine it? The alleged cultural preoccupation with power, nationalism, and order in Russian
society deserves particular attention, since it is often argued that Russian culture possesses a
particular predilection towards authoritarianism and nationalism. Historian Geoffrey Hosking,
for example, argues that the wide frontiers of Russia and the natural difficulty in guarding them
has always made national security a top issue for the Russian state, and the people have always
been ready to sacrifice everything in exchange for it.125 This cultural affiliation towards autocracy
was strengthened by Russia's early self-identification as a state:
The Tartar occupation of the thirteenth century generated...intense Russian national
feeling, which centered on the Orthodox Church, as the one national institution which 
had survived the disaster. And because the church conducted its liturgy not in Latin but 
in a Slavonic tongue close to the vernacular, this national feeling had deep roots among 
the ordinary people. All this imparted to Russian national consciousness from early 
times a demotic quality, a defensiveness, and an earth-boundedness which still have 
strong echoes today...Moscow Grand Dukes proclaimed themselves Tzars (Caesars), 
claiming the heritage of Byzantium, which had fallen tot he infidels in 1453.126 
Richard Sakwa touches upon a similar theme when he claims that a large part of "the mythic
representation  of  Putin's  leadership...is  generated  spontaneously,  drawing  in  particular  upon
mythologized versions of Peter I (the Great) as the great tsar-transformer."127 Russia, he goes on
to note, is "a country where popular attitudes to political authority have traditionally taken on a
sacred aspect."128
Data from polls in the early 2000s, in fact, suggested a willingness of Russians to return
to authoritarianism, so long as doing so guaranteed law and order.129 And from a certain point of
125 Geoffrey Hosking, The First Socialist Society, 16.
126 Ibid., 17.
127 Richard Sakwa, "Myth and Democratic Identity in Russia," 206.
128 Ibid.
129 As cited in Sven Gunnar Simonsen, "Nationalism and the Russian Political Spectrum, " 270.
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view, this trend has not  substantially changed.  Recently 60% of Russians  polled said that  it
would be advantageous for the president to control both the courts and the parliament, while a
disturbing 40% of Russians as of 2009 felt that power should always be in the hands of an "iron-
fist" ruler, with 31% saying there were times when it is appropriate.130
Despite this, Mister and Willerton find no substantial evidence that Russians reward Putin
out of a nationalist ideology in 2003, not do they find political actions which would imply a
reverence for authoritarianism to be a significant explanatory factor.131 Perhaps most surprising is
their debunking of the common wisdom that the second Chechen War had a positive increase on
Putin's popularity.132 
Steven Fish also finds admiration of authoritarianism (as well as Russia's civic culture in
general)  to  be  largely lacking in  explanatory power  in  accounting  for  Russia's  authoritarian
government.  While  a  larger  than  average  number  of  Russians  do  in  fact  approve  of  an
authoritarian government (49%), this establishes only a very "modest...relationship between the
size of the pro authoritarian population and actual regime type."133 Russian attitudes towards trust
and general intolerance are found to be even less significant.134
Interviews with Russian citizens conducted by Ellen Carnagham citizens in the late 90s
and early 2000s bear out these sorts of conclusions. Unlike those cultural theorists and historians
who  posit  an  idiosyncratic  nature  of  Russian  culture  which  precludes  the  development  of
democracy based on civil rights, Carnagham finds that Russians dislike their own democratic
institutions for their poor performance--and not democratic institutions in general.135 And when
130 Levada Centre, "Obshestvennoe Mnenie 2009," http://www.levada.ru/sborniki.html.
131 Mishler and Willerton, 129-130.
132 Ibid., 131.
133 Fish, 111.
134 Ibid., 110-111.
135 Ellen Carnagham, "Thinking about Democracy: Interviews with Russian Citizens."
43
asked  about  Yeltsin,  most  respondents  in  her  analysis  were  unhappy  with  his  "autocratic
behavior";  on the contrary,  they credited him with  the individual  freedoms that  had become
institutionalized under his watch.136 If hers (and other analysis mentioned above) are correct, it is
likely that those polled Russians who do respond favorably to an "iron handed ruler" reflect
frustration  with  governance,  corruption,  the  rule  or  law,  etc.  in  Russia,  and  perhaps  not  a
particular disdain for liberalism.
As a final point concerning the nationalism/authoritarianism issue, it is interesting to note
that if Russia has become more authoritarian over the past decade, then according to one poll the
majority of the population does not  recognize it.  Only 11% call what is occurring in Russia
"authoritarianism"; almost as many (9%) call it the installation of democracy. Forty-two percent
call it the laying down of order, while 19% feel that it is in fact chaos; 20% did not know how to
reply. In fact, a relative majority believes that Russia is in fact moving towards a democracy
(40%). 
Like in most Western countries, more practical concerns such as economic factors do a
better job of explaining the approval of Russian leaders. During Putin's two terms as president
real incomes increased two-fold, while poverty was cut in half. Similarly, GDP grew by 70%,
while wages outpaced inflation. Moreover, dips in Putin/Medvedev approval in late 2009, where
approval  ratings  dropped  around  six  points,  appear  to  be  somewhat  linked  to  economic
fluctuations during the crisis. And when asked what Medvedev's greatest accomplishment in his
two years  of  being president is,  14% cite  an increase in wages,  pensions,  and stipends,  8%
referred to his solving of social problems, while 7% what he accomplished in foreign relations
(the  war  with  Georgia,  etc).  Only one  percent  cited the increased  international  prestige  and
136 Ibid., 354-355.
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power of Russia, once again arguing (at least partially) against the nationalism-authoritarianism
explanation. In fact, the one percent who did cite accomplishments implying nationalism was
less  than  the  three  percent,  who  on  the  contrary cited  Medvedev's  cooperation  with  other
countries, including even better relations with the U.S.137 
Richard  Rose,  William  Mishler,  and  Neil  Munro  together  argue  that  support  for  the
regime  simply  implies  a  fear  of  any  other  alternatives,  or  at  least  the  feeling  that  ideal
alternatives are out of reach, rather than enthusiastic approval for current policies.138 
Expectations are particularly important in an autocratic regime. Instead of trying to win 
the normative commitment of subjects, as would be the case in the consolidating support 
for a democratic regime, autocratic leaders need only make subjects believe that there is 
no alternative to the current regime. When subjects see little or no chance of 
changing regimes, then they can avoid frustration by giving acceptance to the powers 
that be.139
As of 2005, according to their analysis, the mere passage of time (from the collapse of the Soviet
Union to 2006) accounted for roughly 42% of regime support--a three-point increase annually.140
This explanation proposes that Russians judge the modern regime largely by comparing it to the
far more suppressive Soviet regime.141 The implication is also that the average Russian has rather
low standards in evaluating the performance of the government. While improvement in political
performance has a marginal effect, Russians are very likely to give their approval as long as the
regime is less repressive and more prosperous than the Soviet Regime.142 It  should be noted,
however, that their analysis measures support for the regime as a whole and does not take into
account individual measurements for the president or prime minister.
137 Fond Obshchestvennoe Mnenie, "D. Medvedev: Dva Goda na Postu
Prezidenta,"http://bd.fom.ru/pdf/d10medvedev10.pdf.
138 Rose et. al, 167-168.
139 Ibid., 176-177.
140 Ibid., 178.
141 Ibid., 143.
142 Ibid.
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While a cultural preoccupation with authoritarianism or nationalism is not an accurate
predictor of regime approval or presidential approval, there are still factors beyond immediate
pragmatics  that  play a  significant  role  in  determining support  of  the  government.  Indeed,  a
significant portion of United Russia's  approval  seems to be connected to the personality and
popularity of Putin.143 In addition to his association with the Russia  siloviki--typically macho
men of military or intelligence service fame--Putin's divisiveness and steadfastness in standing
up to the West has earned him the reputation as strong and capable leader.144 Colton and Hal
calculate that mere personal appeal accounts for 64% of Putin votes.145 For example, although
their study shows that an improved economy was a significant predictor of United Russia success
in the 2007 Duma elections, the majority of support is linked to Putin's charisma, particularly
since the majority of United Russia votes came from those who reported no real economic gains
under Putin.146 Rose et. al seem to agree: the drastic differences in personality between Putin and
Yeltsin accounts for a significant difference in approval, with fluctuations in Putin's approval due
to "intermittent changes in political and economic performance."147  Once again, Carnagham's
interviews support these conclusions. At least in February of 2000, most respondents "stressed...
[Putin's] energy, vitality, youth, education, experience, and decisiveness," and not any qualities
tied to authoritarianism.148
We may conclude by stating that Russians are not against democracy. On the contrary, in
general they are for it, though what they imagine the concept to mean is not perfectly clear. It is
certainly not popular when it is depicted as being of a "Western" type, and it is endorsed less as
143 Timothy J. Colton and Henry E. Hale, "The Putin Vote: Presidential Electorates in a Hybrid Regime," 473, 479.
144 Dmitri K. Simes and Paul J. Saunders, "The Kremlin Begs to Differ."
145 Colton and Hale, 501.
146 Ibid., 481, 488, 491.
147 Rose et. al, 169-170.
148 Carnagham, 355.
46
an ideal type of government in Russia than in the eight formerly communist countries of eastern
Europe that (as of 2005) are members of the European Union.149 On the other hand, what might
seem  to  be  indifference  towards  democracy  and  tacit  approval  of  a  rather  repressive  and
authoritarian government is  often a  hidden priority for a  better  economy or  acceptance of  a
regime that is at least not as repressive as the  Soviet Union.
 By the numbers  alone,  Russians  approve  of  authoritarianism more  than  the  average
country, but statistically this factor is found to account for rather little. Nonetheless, if the polls
cited here are accurate at all it is safe to say that Russia is still culturally different from the West.
Respect for authoritarianism may be overemphasized, but it is still significantly higher than in
many other countries. Moreover, while it may be inadequate for explaining the type of regime
Russia  has,  it  may  play  a  role  in  explaining  why  Russians  satsifaction  with  the  current
government is as high as it is, all things taken into consideration. 
And a culture of  individual rights, based on libertarian values, is certainly not the same in
Russia, any other factor notwithstanding. To be sure, 54% believe order is more important that
civil rights, while 38% believe the opposite.150 Even civil rights themselves seem to be evaluated
much more differently than in, say,  the U.S. When asked to rank the most important  human
rights, Russians place the right to health care and employment far above the right to freedom of
speech, property, religion, and right to vote for representatives.151 On the other hand, one cannot
go too far with this; for, as we have seen, civil rights do matter to Russians (even if economic
security might be marginally more important) and is a significant predictor of support for the
regime vis-a-vis the Soviet system or autocratic theoretical alternatives, such as a dictatorship,
149 Rose et. al, 128.
150 Levada Centre, "Obshestvennoe Mnenie 2009," http://www.levada.ru/sborniki.html.
151 Ibid.
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military rule, etc. 
Does, then, Russia have an idiosyncratic civic culture? It should come as no surprise, for
example, that Russians emphasize "economic welfare values" differently than do Americans and
therefore identify them as part of democracy to a much greater degree.152 Nor should one be too
surprised to find that Russians put somewhat less importance on individual liberties to the benefit
of  order,  especially  given  both  Russia's  history  of  autocratic  rule  and  periods  of  immense
disorder and suffering, as well as the fact that Russians have already cashed in on a considerably
large number of personal liberties since the mid-1980's. Beyond that, however, it does not seem
to be  the  case  that  Russians  are  so  different  that  they put  nationalism above democracy or
enshrine authoritarianism to the degree that it is sometimes entertained. Rather, they are more
likely to resign themselves to the latter, for example, as long as things are at least marginally
better than they were in the past.  This, in addition to evidence which shows Russians evaluate
their leaders somewhat differently than other countries, is sufficient to conclude that political or
civic culture in Russia is somewhat different, though not substantially.
152 Rose et. al, 127.
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CHAPTER 5
COCLUSIOS
That Russia's categorization as a democracy has been called into doubt should surprise no
one. Both civic institutions and political culture are weak and underdeveloped. And though the
hegemony of official one party rule under the Soviet Union is no more, the present situation  is
similar in many ways. Namely, the political process is almost entirely controlled through the
Kremlin, and by extension, its loyal party of power, which itself was created by elites from the
top. In place of any substantive program or political ideology, this party's only real purpose is to
secure  control  for  the  Kremlin.  And  though  the  party  of  power  has  has  passed  from  one
incarnation to the next since 1992, there has been no real transfer of power from one party to the
other. 
We  have  seen  that  electoral  fraud  is  indeed  a  problem  for  Russia's  transition  to
democracy. The cries of falsification, however, naturally create the impression that elections in
Russia are fixed and that the winners illegitimately obtain office. My purpose has been not to
excuse  any  falsification,  but  rather  to  show  that  in  spite  of  it  there  are  good  reasons  for
concluding that the majority of Russians nonetheless support and vote for Putin, Medvedev, as
well  as  United  Russia  candidates.  It  follows  that  those  who  are  elected  are  elected  quasi-
legitimately.  Although the organization of  parties  is  weaker at  the local  level,  United Russia
garners a large amount of the populace's support, from which I argue it stands to infer that these
same voters would likely vote for United Russia at the national level, as well. Elections in Russia
therefore appear  to  be causally overdetermined. Since 2000 the president and United Russia
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candidates in the national Duma have been strongly supported by the people, though in some
cases  (especially  regional  republics)  ballot  boxes  are  probably  stuffed  and  voter  turnout  is
drastically inflated.  However,  examining the relative consistency between support  for  United
Russia in local elections across regions, as well as correspondence between local elections and
national  ones,  falsified  returns  appear  to  be  the  exception  to  the  rule.  This  argument  is
strengthened  by the unequivocal  support  for  Putin,  Medvedev,  and  United  Russia  in  several
polls. The falsification that does occur, then, it is highly unlikely to truly alter any outcome. 
We have seen that there are several explanations for Putin's popularity (and by extension
the popularity of Medvedev and United Russia). Though Putin has tightened control over the
political arena since his rise to power, the economy has at the same time strongly rebounded
from its dismal state of the 1990s. We saw, moreover, that a significant portion of support for
Putin is due to his personal charisma. At the same time, support for Putin does not imply that
claims that Russians are particularly inclined towards authoritarian governments are viable. It
follows that the improvements of the Russian state, the personality of Putin, combined with the
indifference of many Russians towards politics, which is reflected in the sometimes contradictory
attitude toward democracy, along with the phenomenon that tolerance for the regime naturally
grows over time goes the furthest in explaining why the majority of Russians support Putin,
Medvedev, and United Russia. 
50
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aaron, Leon. Russia's Revolution. Washington D.C.: AEI Press, 2006.
Abdullaev, Nabi. "New 'Just Russia' Party Says Putin Knows Best." The St. Petersbug Times.
October 31, 2006, http://www.times.spb.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=19303.
Center for the Study of Public Policy University of Aberdeen. "Voting Behaviour-Presidency,"
http://www.russiavotes.org/president/presidency_vote_preferences.php.
Colton, Timothy J. and Henry E. Hale. "The Putin Vote: Presidential Electorates in a Hybrid
Regime." Slavic Review 68 (Fall 2009).
The Economist. "The Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index,"
http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_TABLE_2007_v3.pdf.
"EU Calls on Russia to Answer Election Criticism." Forbes.com. December 4, 2007,
http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2007/12/04/afx4401951.html.
Fish, Stephen. Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics. Cambridge
University Press, 2005.
Freedom House. "Map of Freedom in the World," http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?
page=363&year=2009.
Gaplin, Richard. "Stalin's New Status in Russia." BBC 4ews. December 27, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7798497.stm
Golos. "Vybory v Rossii 11 Oktiabri 2009 Goda,"
http://www.golos.org/IMG/pdf/Doklad_GOLOS_11-10-2009.pdf.
Gunnar, Sven. "Nationalism and the Russian Political Spectrum: Locating and Evaluating the
Extremes," Journal of Political Ideologies 6 (October 2001).
Hale, Henry E. "Why Not Parties? Electoral Markets, Party Substitutes, and Stalled
Democratization in   
     Russia." Comparative Politics 37 (January 2005).
Halpin, Tony. "Dmitri Medvedev Votes Were Rigged, Says Computer Boffin." Times Online,
April 18, 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article3768223.ece
Hosking, Geoffrey The First Socialist Society. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.
51
Hutcheson, Derek. Political Parties in the Russian Regions. New York: Routledge Courzon,
2008. 
Ishiyama, J.T. and S. Shafqat, "Party Identity Change in Post-Communist Politics: The Cases of
the Successor Parties in Hungary, Poland, and Russia." Communist and Post-Communist
Politics 33 (2000).
Konitzer, Andrew. Electing Russia's Governors. Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Press, 2005.
Laverty, Nicklaus. "Limited Choices: Russian Opposition Parties and the 2007 Duma Elections."
Demokratizatsiya 16 (Fall 2008).
Levada Centre. "Monitoring Elektoral'nyx Predpochtenij na Vyborax 2009 goda v Moskovskuyu
Gorodskovckuyu Dumu," http://www.levada.ru/press/2009122501.html.
Levada Centre,."Obshestvennoe Mnenie 2009," http://www.levada.ru/sborniki.html.
"Litsom k Litsu." Radio Svoboda. March 7, 2010,
http://www.svobodanews.ru/archive/ru_bz_ftf/latest/896/110.html.
March, Luke. "Managing Opposition in a Hybrid Regime: Just Russia and Parastal Opposition."
Slavic Review 68 (Fall 2009).
McFaul, Michael, Nikolai Petrov, and Andrei Ryabov. Between Dictatorship and Democracy:
Russian Post-Communist Political Reform. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2004.
Mishler, William and John P. Willerton. "The Dynamics of Presidential Popularity in Post-
Communist Russia: Cultural Imperative versus Neo-Institutional Choice?" The Journal of
Politics 65 (February 2003).
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. "OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation
Report," http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2004/06/3033_ed.pdf.
Petrov, Nikolai. "Digging Their Own Graves at the Polls." The Moscow Times. October 14, 2009,
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=24002.
Petrov, Nikolai. "March Elections: United Voting Day in Russia." Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. March 3, 2010, http://www.carnegie.ru/en/news/84231.htm.
Rose, Richard, William Mishler, and Neil Munro. Russia Transformed. Cambridge University
Press, 2006.
Sakwa, Richard. "Elections and National Integration in Russia." In The 1999-2000 Elections in
52
Russia, edited by Vicki L. Hesli and William M. Reisinger. Cambridge University Press,
2003.
Sakwa,  Richard. "Myth and Democratic Identity in Russia." In Democracy and Myth in Russia
and 
     Eastern Europe, edited by Alexander Woll and Harald Wydra. London: Routledge, 2008.
Sharafutdinova, Gulnaz. "Why Was Democracy Lost in Russia's Regions? Lessons from Nizhni  
     Novgorod." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 40 (September 2007).
Shevtsova, Lilia. "The Kremlin Kowtow." Foreign Policy. January 5, 2009, 
     http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=24666.
Simes, Dimitri K. and Paul J. Saunders. "The Kremlin Begs to Differ." 4ational Interest Online. 
     October 28, 2009,http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=22344.
Slider, Darrell. "Politics in the Regions." In Developments in Russian Politics 6. Durham: Duke
University Press, 2005.
Smyth, Regina. "Strong Partisans, Weak Parties? Party Organizations and the Development of
Mass Partisanship in Russia." Comparative Politics 38 (January 2006).
Sonin, Konstantin. "Falsification Par Excellence." The St. Petersburg Times. October 23, 2009,
http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=30128
Stoner-Weiss, Kathryn. "Central Governing Incapacity and the Weakness of Political Parties:
Russian Democracy in Disarray." The Global Review of Federalism 32 (Spring 2002).
Trenin, Dmitri V. Getting Russia Right. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007.
White, Stephen. "The Political Parties." In Developments in Russian Politics 6, edited by
Stephen White, Zvi Gitelman, and Richard Sakwa. Durham: Duke University Press, 2005.
53
